Vulcan Stock Research

Introduction and Fund Overviews

This report compares six growth-focused ETFs – each with a distinct strategy – on multiple dimensions, including risk/reward, fundamentals, performance, sector allocations, tax efficiency, dividends, and forward outlook. The funds analyzed are:

• FDG – American Century Focused Dynamic Growth ETF: An actively managed, non-transparent ETF launched in 2020 that invests in a focused portfolio (~40 stocks) of early-stage, high-growth U.S. companies. Its goal is long-term capital appreciation from large-cap growth stocks, taking concentrated positions in high-conviction, rapid-growth names. (Expense Ratio: ~0.45%; AUM: ~$250M; Inception: Mar 2020)
• GARP – iShares MSCI USA Quality GARP ETF: A factor/index-based ETF (BlackRock, 2020) tracking an index of large- and mid-cap U.S. companies exhibiting “Growth at a Reasonable Price,” i.e. above-average growth with favorable value and quality metrics. It blends growth and value characteristics by focusing on high growth and high quality (profitability) stocks that are not overly expensive. (Expense: 0.15%; AUM: ~$440M; Inception: Jan 2020)
• SPMO – Invesco S&P 500 Momentum ETF: A passive factor ETF (launched 2015) tracking the S&P 500 Momentum Index, which selects the 100 S&P 500 stocks with the strongest risk-adjusted price momentum. It is factor-tilted toward momentum – the fund is reconstituted semi-annually, rotating into stocks that have recently outperformed. (Expense: 0.13%; AUM: ~$6.0B; Inception: Oct 2015)
• SCHG – Schwab U.S. Large-Cap Growth ETF: A broad passive ETF (launched 2009) tracking the Dow Jones U.S. Large-Cap Growth Index, covering the largest U.S. growth stocks. It provides cap-weighted exposure to large-cap growth equities (similar to the Russell 1000 Growth). This is a low-cost index fund (Expense: 0.04%; AUM: ~$41B) dominated by mega-cap technology and other growth leaders.
• SAMT – Strategas Macro Thematic Opportunities ETF: An actively managed thematic ETF (launched Jan 2022) that leverages Strategas’ macro research to invest in 3–5 intermediate-term themes with the highest conviction. The fund’s holdings span all cap sizes and sectors, dynamically adjusted as macro trends evolve. Essentially, SAMT is an opportunistic multi-theme growth fund, unconstrained by index rules. (Expense: 0.65%; AUM: ~$155M; Inception: Jan 2022)
• QGRO – American Century U.S. Quality Growth ETF: A rules-based/index ETF (launched 2018) that seeks to capture large- and mid-cap U.S. companies with attractive growth AND quality fundamentals. It dynamically allocates between “stable growers” and high-growth companies based on risk-adjusted return analysis, aiming for more consistent growth exposure. (Expense: 0.29%; AUM: ~$1.2B; Inception: Sept 2018)

Despite all being “growth-oriented,” these funds differ in portfolio concentration, factor tilts, and management approach (active vs index). Below we delve into their risk/reward profiles, fundamentals, historical performance (1, 3, 5-year), sector allocations, tax and distribution characteristics, and outlook.

1. Risk vs Reward: Volatility, Sharpe Ratios, and Drawdowns

Volatility varies notably across these ETFs. Concentrated and thematic funds have been the most volatile, while diversified factor funds have been relatively less so:

• FDG (Focused Dynamic Growth) has the highest volatility of the group – a 3-year standard deviation of ~24.1%. Its concentrated 40-stock portfolio of high-beta growth names amplifies volatility (β ≈ 1.14 vs the market). This was evident in 2022’s bear market: FDG’s focus on early-stage tech/consumer firms led to a deeper drawdown (over –40% from peak) compared to broader growth indices (Russell 1000 Growth ~–30%). Such drawdown risk is the trade-off for its high-growth focus.
• GARP (Quality GARP) has shown moderate volatility (~19.6% std dev) in line with the large-growth category. Its quality and value tilt helped limit downside. For example, in 2022 GARP dropped less than the broad growth benchmark (it had alpha +1.94% over the category on a 1-year basis). Beta is ~1.1, but the fund avoided the most overvalued names, resulting in smaller drawdowns.
• SPMO (S&P 500 Momentum) has volatility around the level of the S&P 500 (~20% std dev) despite its sector rotations. Momentum strategy can at times reduce risk by moving into defensive winners. In 2022, SPMO’s shift into energy and defensive stocks cushioned its decline to –10.4% vs –17% for the S&P 500. However, momentum can lag in sudden trend reversals (in 2023, SPMO +17.5% trailed the S&P’s +22.3% rebound). Overall risk is comparable to the market, but sequence of returns risk is higher – momentum may underperform at inflection points even as it shines in trending markets.
• SCHG (Schwab Growth), as a broad index, has volatility (~19.8% std dev) and beta ~1.0 similar to the large-cap growth benchmark. Its drawdowns mirror the overall growth market (e.g. –29% in 2022, roughly matching the Russell 1000 Growth’s –29.1%). There is little idiosyncratic risk due to its broad diversification (250+ stocks). Risk-adjusted, SCHG has been solid with a 3-year Sharpe ≈0.65.
• SAMT (Strategas Thematic), being active with only ~40 stocks across a few themes, can be volatile (no long history yet, but its multi-theme approach still resulted in a sizeable 2022 drawdown). In 2022 it underperformed broad indexes (3-year annual return only ~4.1% vs S&P 500’s 8.6%), implying higher volatility and some timing risk in theme shifts. The presence of non-equity holdings (e.g. ~4% gold) and cash (~7% recently) may dampen swings, but overall risk will depend on the chosen themes’ performance. As of now, we estimate SAMT’s volatility to be on par with or above broad market volatility, given its 91% portfolio turnover and concentrated bets (the fund had a ~25% drawdown from inception through 2022).
• QGRO (Quality Growth) exhibits volatility (~20.6% std dev) close to the index, but a slightly lower beta (0.94) thanks to its quality tilt. Its drawdowns have been slightly smaller than pure growth benchmarks. For example, QGRO’s blend of stable growers helped it weather 2022 relatively well (3Y R² 0.87, indicating some independent positioning). Still, QGRO is fully invested in equities, so it saw significant declines in 2022 (–27%) but also quick recovery after.

Risk-Adjusted Returns (Sharpe Ratio): The Sharpe ratio highlights the funds’ reward per unit of volatility. Here we see a wide range:

• GARP has delivered the best risk-adjusted performance, with a 3-year Sharpe ≈ 0.72 (far above the large-growth category’s 0.50). This reflects its strong alpha (+4.7% annual) over 3 years and disciplined avoidance of the most overhyped stocks. GARP’s balanced approach paid off: Morningstar rates it 5-star with a Gold analyst rating for its superior risk-adjusted returns.
• SCHG has also been solid, Sharpe ~0.65 in recent years, benefiting from the tremendous run-up of mega-cap tech in 2019–2021. It captures market beta efficiently with minimal drag from fees (only 0.04% expense). Its Sharpe is roughly in line with the Russell Growth index’s (the index Sharpe was ~0.63 over 5 years) and indicates favorable reward/risk given the tech boom.
• SPMO’s risk/reward has been favorable over certain periods – for instance, in the last 1-year it achieved a Sharpe ~1.03 (significantly high) as momentum names outperformed. Over longer multi-year periods its Sharpe has been closer to ~0.5 (est.), as the strategy’s outperformance in down markets and certain rallies is partly offset by lagging in sharp rebounds. Overall, momentum has delivered a long-run premium, but with episodic underperformance (hence long-term Sharpe likely moderate).
• QGRO’s 3-year Sharpe is ~0.36**, lower than the category average. This reflects that its strategy underperformed pure growth in the 2020-2021 surge (due to quality bias) yet still suffered in 2022’s downturn (due to equity exposure). However, its 5-year Sharpe has improved after strategy tweaks in 2023 (the fund began tracking a refined index), and recent results are stronger. QGRO is rated 5-star by Morningstar as of April 2025, and analysts note its revamped approach is now “outperforming popular ETFs while balancing growth, value, and quality” – suggesting better risk-adjusted returns may lie ahead.
• FDG has the lowest Sharpe (~0.15** over 3 years)**, reflecting its high volatility and weaker performance during the 2021–2022 cycle. Its concentrated high-growth bets struggled when growth stocks crashed in 2022, resulting in poor risk-adjusted returns. (Notably, FDG’s 3Y alpha was –2.8%, indicating underperformance relative to its high beta.) That said, FDG can shine in pure bull markets – e.g. it likely dramatically outperformed in parts of 2020 and 2023 – but over a full cycle its reward per unit risk has been relatively low.
• SAMT’s short history makes its Sharpe hard to quantify, but given its ~4% annual return vs high volatility since 2022, its risk-adjusted metric has been low (rough estimate Sharpe ~0.2–0.3). The fund’s high turnover (91%) and thematic concentration introduce timing risk that so far has not added significant excess return. However, if its macro calls prove correct in the coming years, this could improve.

Maximum Drawdown Risk: All these equity ETFs experienced steep COVID-crisis drops (–30% in Feb–Mar 2020) and 2022 bear market declines. Broad large-cap growth (SCHG) fell roughly –32% peak-to-trough in 2020 and about –29% in 2022. Notably in 2022: FDG’s concentrated growth portfolio likely fell over –40%, among the worst, whereas GARP and SPMO contained losses to around –10% to –20% (GARP held up thanks to reasonable valuations, SPMO rotated into energy/utilities just in time). QGRO and SCHG were in between (–25% to –30%). SAMT launched at the start of 2022 and immediately hit a drawdown (approx –25% in its first year) as some themes (e.g. growth tech) sold off. These patterns underscore that concentration and factor exposure drive drawdown differences: a momentum or quality tilt can buffer against downturns, while an aggressive growth focus can exacerbate declines.

Overall, GARP and SCHG have offered the smoothest ride (lower volatility, higher Sharpe), FDG the bumpiest (high volatility, low risk-adjusted returns), and the others fall in between. Investors must align these risk profiles with their tolerance – e.g. FDG and SAMT are for those willing to endure big swings for potential outsized growth, whereas GARP and SCHG have been more stable growth options.

2. Fundamental & Quantitative Metrics (Growth, Valuations, Profitability)

Next, we compare the fundamentals of each ETF’s portfolio – such as earnings growth rates, valuation multiples, and return on equity – which shed light on their investment approach:

• Earnings Growth: All funds target above-average earnings growth, but FDG and QGRO stand out for holding companies with exceptionally high growth rates. FDG’s portfolio has a weighted EPS growth rate of ~49.3% (median) – far higher than the Russell 1000 Growth Index’s ~33.5%. This is consistent with FDG’s mandate to own early-stage, rapid growers. QGRO similarly emphasizes growth – its holdings’ EPS growth is ~48.9%, reflecting a mix of stable growers and some high-growth names. In contrast, GARP’s index likely has more moderate growth (perhaps in the 20–30% range) since it balances growth with reasonable valuation – it may exclude the absolute fastest growers if they are too expensive. SPMO’s growth rate will fluctuate with its holdings – currently, because momentum has shifted back to tech, its earnings growth profile is high (many momentum stocks like NVIDIA, Meta had surging earnings in the last year). SCHG, as a broad growth fund, roughly matches the Russell Growth’s profile (~25–30% EPS growth historically in bull phases). SAMT’s growth metrics vary by theme – it can hold some lower-growth, value-oriented stocks as part of macro themes (e.g. utilities, gold, etc.), so its overall earnings growth may not be as high as the pure growth indexes at times. For example, as of 2025 one of SAMT’s themes includes “Industrial Power” and holdings like Berkshire Hathaway and Entergy, which have single-digit to mid-teens earnings growth, alongside tech names and even a pre-earnings startup (Rocket Lab). Thus, SAMT blends high-growth and cyclical names depending on the theme.
• Valuation Multiples (P/E, P/S): All six ETFs trade at premium valuations relative to the broad market, consistent with growth investing. However, there are notable differences:
  • FDG is among the most expensive: Its portfolio P/E ratio ~36.7× (trailing), which is higher than the Russell 1000 Growth’s ~32.5×. This suggests FDG tilts toward richly valued growth (early-stage firms often have high P/Es). Its Price/Sales would likewise be elevated (many holdings are in high-growth tech with substantial revenue multiples). In fact, FDG’s holdings generate such little current income that its 30-day SEC yield is –0.24% (negative) – indicating valuations are based on future growth (and the fund’s dividend income is essentially zero).
  • QGRO has a lower P/E (~30.1×) than the broad growth benchmark, despite similar growth rates. This reflects QGRO’s “quality at a reasonable price” tilt – it avoids some of the most overpriced names. For instance, as of Q1 2025, QGRO’s P/E was ~30× vs Russell Growth’s ~32×, implying a slightly more attractive valuation for comparable growth. Its Price/Book was ~4.2×, notably lower than the Russell Growth’s ~11× (many of QGRO’s stable growers have substantial book equity).
  • GARP’s valuation is deliberately constrained by its methodology. As of May 2025, GARP’s P/E was ~34.5× – still high, but this fund generally tries to avoid extremes. It likely excludes the most expensive growth stocks. For context, GARP’s index uses a composite of value and quality scores; thus, its holdings often have better valuation metrics (e.g., lower P/E or P/Cash Flow) than a pure growth index. Its Price/Book is around 9.3×, which is high in absolute terms (due to tech dominance) but a bit lower than pure growth indexes. In essence, GARP attempts to balance growth and valuation, hence the name.
  • SPMO’s valuation will mirror the market’s momentum leaders. Currently, many momentum leaders are large tech companies (which tend to have high P/E). However, interestingly SPMO’s trailing P/E is ~28.5×, slightly lower than the S&P 500 Growth’s, likely because momentum recently included some value-oriented winners (e.g. energy stocks from 2022 or industrials). Over time, momentum doesn’t explicitly seek cheap stocks, but by focusing on price performance, it sometimes holds surprisingly moderate valuations if those happen to be winning (for example, in 2022 it held a lot of energy companies which had low P/Es but high price gains). That said, in bull markets, SPMO will load up on high-P/E tech when they are in favor. Its current P/B ~3.9× suggests a mix of asset-heavy firms (energy, industrials) along with tech.
  • SCHG’s valuation essentially matches the mega-cap growth segment: P/E around 35× (trailing) and P/B ~9×. It holds the likes of Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, NVIDIA in market-cap proportion – these stocks collectively trade at high earnings multiples (Apple ~30x, Microsoft ~33x, Amazon and NVIDIA higher). Thus, SCHG reflects the valuation froth of big tech in late 2021 and again in 2023. It doesn’t screen for value, so when growth stocks get pricey, SCHG’s multiples expand accordingly. (For instance, SCHG’s P/E peaked around 40× in late 2021).
  • SAMT’s valuations are heterogeneous. By design, it can hold some value names alongside growth names. Currently its top holdings include Berkshire Hathaway (a value play, P/B < 1.5, P/E ~20), Entergy (a utility with P/E ~16), as well as Intuitive Surgical (growth med-tech, P/E ~70+) and Rocket Lab (no earnings). So the aggregate P/E is not very informative – likely in a moderate range. Importantly, SAMT is willing to hold non-traditional assets like physical gold (which it did ~4% allocation) as part of a theme. Such holdings have no P/E at all. Therefore, SAMT’s portfolio P/E at any time is an eclectic mix. At end of 2024, SAMT’s distribution yield (which included realized gains) was ~1.3%, implying its holdings had a bit more income/gains realization than pure growth funds – consistent with the presence of some value-oriented stocks.
• Return on Equity (ROE) and Quality: A key differentiator is the profitability of holdings. Quality-oriented funds have higher ROE:
  • GARP and QGRO emphasize quality – their indices explicitly or implicitly require high ROE, high margins, etc. For example, QGRO’s holdings average ROE ~41.7%, which is very robust. The Russell 1000 Growth by comparison is around 48–50% ROE (skewed by extremely profitable mega-caps). GARP’s exact ROE isn’t given, but since it overlaps with many quality names, we infer it holds companies with solid profitability (likely ROEs well above 20–30%). Indeed, the “Quality” factor in its index favors firms with high return on equity and low leverage. Many of GARP’s top positions – e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Mastercard – have ROEs in the 30–40%+ range, bolstering the fund’s average ROE.
  • FDG tilts toward lower-current-ROE companies. Its focus on earlier stage growth means many holdings are still scaling up profitability (or even unprofitable). FDG’s average ROE is ~35.4%, lower than the broad growth index (which was ~52.8% at the time). This indicates FDG holds more companies that are investing for growth at the expense of current profitability (for instance, companies like Tesla or startups with thin margins). The trade-off is higher earnings growth but lower ROE at present.
  • SCHG, by tracking the growth index, includes both high-ROE tech giants (e.g. Apple’s ROE ~147% on negative equity, Microsoft ~45%) and some lower-ROE growth firms. The net ROE of the index has been quite high (40–50% range) due to the dominance of highly profitable firms (FAANG stocks have huge returns on capital). So SCHG’s quality is actually strong by traditional measures, though it’s not explicitly selecting for it – it’s an artifact of big profitable tech being categorized as growth.
  • SPMO does not screen for quality, so its ROE depends on what’s in favor. During periods when high-quality stocks lead momentum, SPMO’s ROE will be high; but if cyclical or turnaround stocks are the momentum leaders, ROE could be lower. For example, energy companies in 2022 had sky-high ROE (oil companies’ profitability spiked), which actually gave SPMO a quality boost that year. At other times, momentum might hold more speculative names. Over the long run, momentum factor funds often have slightly lower average ROE than quality-focused funds (since recent price performance can come from both high and low quality firms).
  • SAMT explicitly can hold non-profitable or low-ROE firms if they fit a theme (e.g. it holds Robinhood (HOOD) ~3% weight, which has negative earnings/ROE, as a play on fintech innovation). Simultaneously, it holds Berkshire, which has ~20% ROE, and Costco (~29% ROE). Therefore, SAMT’s composite ROE is middle-of-the-road, and it will swing depending on theme. It doesn’t mind sacrificing current profitability if a theme (like “Next-gen Space Economy” in the case of Rocket Lab) is compelling for future growth.

In summary, FDG and QGRO hold the fastest growers ( ~45–50% EPS growth ) but with different profitability profiles – QGRO insists on quality, FDG tolerates low profits. GARP and QGRO trade at relatively saner valuations than a pure growth index (trying to deliver growth at a reasonable price), whereas FDG and SCHG fully embrace high multiples for high growth. SPMO will mirror whatever segment has momentum (often high-growth tech, but not always), and SAMT is a unique blend that can include non-traditional assets and value plays in pursuit of macro themes. These fundamental differences align with each fund’s strategy – from aggressive growth (FDG) to growth-at-reasonable-price (GARP) to quality-growth (QGRO) to pure momentum (SPMO), etc.

Below is a snapshot comparing key fundamental metrics:

ETF	P/E (TTM)	P/B	EPS Growth	ROE	Notes
FDG (Focused Growth)	~36.7×	8.7×	49% (high)	35%	Concentrated in early-stage, richly valued high-growth stocks.
GARP (Quality GARP)	~34.5×	9.3×	~20–25% (moderate)	est. ~30%+	Growth at reasonable price; filters out extreme valuations, holds high-ROE firms.
SPMO (Momentum)	~28.5×	3.9×	~25% (varies)	n/a (mixed)	Holds recent winners; valuation and quality depend on market leadership (currently tech-heavy).
SCHG (Broad Growth)	~35×	9.0×	~25–30% (index)	~40–50%	Mega-cap growth index; high valuations driven by big tech, but also very profitable companies.
SAMT (Thematic)	n/a (blend of growth & value)	n/a	Varies by theme	Varies	Mix of sectors (e.g. industrials, fintech, gold). Valuation/ROE span a wide range (some non-earnings holdings).
QGRO (Quality Growth)	~30.1×	4.2×	49% (high)	42% (high)	Emphasizes high growth and fundamentals; notably lower P/E and P/B than pure growth index.

Table: Fundamental metrics for each ETF’s portfolio. QGRO and FDG boast the highest earnings growth (~50%), but QGRO’s valuation is more tempered. GARP and QGRO prioritize profitability and reasonable pricing. SPMO and SCHG reflect market-driven metrics (momentum or cap-weighted growth), while SAMT’s metrics are idiosyncratic to its chosen themes.

3. Performance Backtesting: 1-Year, 3-Year, 5-Year Total Returns

We now compare historical total returns over the past 1, 3, and 5-year periods (assuming reinvested dividends):

• 1-Year Trailing Performance: The last year (through mid-2025) has seen growth stocks rebound strongly from the 2022 downturn – albeit unevenly across strategies:
  • FDG has had a strong 1-year rebound (approx +20% to +25% range) as many of its high-growth holdings (e.g. NVIDIA, Tesla, Meta – its top holdings) surged in the AI-driven tech rally of late 2022 and 2023. This helped recover some of its 2022 losses. (Precise 1Y figure: as of Mar 31, 2025 FDG was up ~+10.6%, but by May 2025 likely higher given tech strength).
  • GARP returned roughly +18–20% over the last 1 year (estimate). It benefited from its large allocations to big tech (which rallied) but also from value/quality selections which held up. GARP likely lagged the pure tech-fueled indexes slightly (because it underweighted the most expensive hyper-growth names). Still, its 1Y Sharpe was a healthy 0.70, indicating a strong absolute return with moderate volatility.
  • SPMO was a top performer in the recent year. It gained about +27% (trailing 12 months as of May 2025), outpacing most peers. This was driven by momentum darlings like NVIDIA (which more than doubled in 12 months) and other winners that the momentum index rotated into. SPMO’s ability to capture trending stocks early paid off. For context, the S&P 500 was up ~12% in the same 1-yr period, so SPMO added significant excess return by concentrating in the strongest names.
  • SCHG (broad growth) delivered around +10–12% in the last year (essentially matching the Russell 1000 Growth index, which was +7.8% for 1Y ending 3/31/25, and a bit more by May). Mega-cap growth like Apple, Microsoft, and Google had steady gains, and SCHG’s performance reflects that steady recovery. It lagged the specialized growth funds that held more mid/smaller high-fliers (e.g. QGRO or FDG with their broader set of growth names).
  • SAMT had an impressive recent run, roughly +21% NAV return for the 1-year ending April 30, 2025. This beat the S&P 500’s +11.6% for the same period. The thematic calls that drove this outperformance included heavy exposure to tech/AI in late 2023 (which surged) and timely positioning in industrial and energy themes that also did well. However, SAMT’s performance came with volatility – it gave up some gains earlier (Q1 2025 was flat while the S&P 500 fell).
  • QGRO outperformed broad growth in the last year, returning about +23–24% (market price) vs ~12% for the large-growth category. Its dynamic allocation to both “stable” and “high” growth stocks allowed it to capture the tech rally (it held winners like Meta, Netflix, etc.) while its quality discipline avoided some laggards. QGRO’s 1-year return of ~23% is corroborated by Yahoo Finance data (fund +23.3% vs category +12.3%). This strong showing earned QGRO a 5-star rating and validates its strategy adjustments.

Overall, momentum (SPMO) and quality-growth (QGRO) led the 1-year performance, followed by the concentrated active funds (FDG, SAMT) not far behind, while the broad index (SCHG) and GARP were positive but comparatively modest. This indicates that factor-driven and stock-picking approaches added value in the recent rally.

• 3-Year Performance (Annualized): This period (roughly mid-2022 through mid-2025, encompassing the 2022 downturn and subsequent recovery) smooths out the extremes:
  • GARP has the highest 3Y annualized return, about +12%/year (estimated). In fact, GARP delivered ~4.7%/yr alpha over the average large-growth fund in this timeframe, and its Sharpe of 0.72 is evidence of strong performance. GARP navigated the 2022–2023 whipsaw effectively – by avoiding the worst of the crash and participating in the rebound. Its focus on reasonable valuations meant it didn’t soar as high in 2021, but it also didn’t fall as hard in 2022, yielding a superior compound result. (Note: Precise 3Y for GARP isn’t published, but given its alpha and Sharpe, we infer ~12% vs Russell Growth ~10%.)
  • SCHG (and the Russell 1000 Growth index) has around +10%/year over the last 3 years (ending 3/31/25, Russell Growth was +10.1% annual). This is a respectable result given the intervening bear market – essentially large-cap growth earned ~10% annually despite a –30% trough, thanks to the huge 2021 run-up and late-2023 recovery. SCHG’s 3-year performance is roughly in line with that index.
  • QGRO trails slightly with about +6–7%/year over 3 years. Its fact sheet shows a 3-year total return of ~20.6% (cumulative), which annualizes to ~6.5%/yr. QGRO’s underperformance relative to SCHG in this period is likely due to its mid-cap exposure and possibly missing some of the mega-cap gains in 2021 (as it tilted to other names). However, notably QGRO generated positive alpha in 2022–2023 – its 3Y alpha was +2.2% – so most of this lag happened earlier. Since its index methodology change in mid-2023, QGRO has been outperforming more consistently.
  • FDG unfortunately lagged over the 3-year window. After its 2022 drawdown, FDG’s three-year annual return is roughly in the low-to-mid single digits (we estimate ~+4–5%/year). This aligns with its negative alpha (–2.8) and Sharpe 0.15 – it did not fully recover the ground lost in 2022. Essentially, FDG magnified the cycle: it soared higher in late 2020/2021, then fell harder in 2022, leaving the 3-year result underwhelming. Active stock picks did not beat the index in this timeframe.
  • SPMO comes out slightly ahead of the S&P 500 over 3 years. Based on Yahoo data, from Jan 2020 to Jan 2023 SPMO had an annualized ~+8.6% vs S&P500 +7.1% (for the specific 3-year ended Jan ’23; for mid-2022 to mid-2025 it should be comparable). In the calendar 2020-2022 span, SPMO’s pattern was: +28% in 2020 (beating S&P), +22.6% in 2021 (lagging slightly), and –10.5% in 2022 (beating S&P’s –18%). The net effect is slight outperformance. As of early 2025, its 3-year trailing return (ending 3/31/25) was ~4.16% cumulative relative to 2022 market peak to 2025, but if measuring from just after the 2020 crash, it’s higher. In simpler terms, momentum’s ability to protect in 2022 contributed a lot, but giving up some upside in 2023 kept the 3Y gain moderate. We can say SPMO’s ~3-year annual return has been in the high single digits, around 8–10% annualized, roughly matching the broad market with less downside.
  • SAMT, since inception in Jan 2022, has a 3-year annualized NAV return of ~4.1% (through Apr 2025) – significantly below the S&P 500’s +8.6% for the same period. In absolute terms, SAMT’s NAV went from $25 at launch to ~$31.5 now. The underperformance is attributable to its slow start in 2022 (launching at a market peak, then losing ground in H1 2022). By 2023-2024 it started outperforming, but not enough to fully catch up. The thematic timing had mixed results: some themes (AI, defense, etc.) paid off big, while others lagged in the recovery. Thus, over the ~2.3 years since inception, SAMT has positive but modest annualized returns. We should note, however, that on a since inception cumulative basis, SAMT is +6.4% total (NAV) vs +9.0% for the S&P 500 (Jan 26, 2022 – Apr 30, 2025), so it’s only slightly trailing in total dollars despite the lower annualized figure – this gap could close with one strong thematic cycle.

Summarizing 3-year results: GARP (~12%/yr) > SCHG (~10%/yr) > SPMO (~9%/yr) ≈ QGRO (~7%/yr) > SAMT (~4–5%/yr) > FDG (~4%/yr). The more balanced strategies (GARP) actually outpaced the pure aggressive strategy (FDG) over this turbulent period, highlighting the importance of drawdown management. Pure broad exposure (SCHG) did well too, as mega-cap tech retained leadership.

• 5-Year Performance (Annualized): The 5-year period (2018–2023 or roughly May 2020–May 2025, depending on data availability) largely captures a strong growth bull run (2019–2021) plus the 2022 correction:
  • SCHG (broad large growth) has an excellent 5-year track record, roughly ~15%/year. For instance, from 12/2017 to 12/2022 it earned +14.9% annualized, and including 2023 likely around mid-teens. This reflects the dominance of large-cap growth in the late 2010s and the pandemic era. A $10k investment 5 years ago in SCHG would have grown to around $20k+ today. This is in line with the S&P 500 Growth Index returns (for reference, Russell 1000 Growth did ~20%/yr over the 5 years ending 3/31/25 – though that may be inflated by starting right after the 2018 dip; more broadly 2018–2023 was closer to mid-teens per annum).
  • GARP’s since-inception (5.3-year) record is also very strong. From Jan 2020 to mid-2025, GARP has outperformed. Its 5-year Sharpe of 0.85 vs category 0.63 suggests not only lower risk but also higher returns. We estimate GARP’s 5-year annualized return ~13–14%. (It launched just before the 2020 crash, then benefited from the recovery and factor tailwinds.) GARP’s ability to deliver double-digit returns with less volatility is noteworthy – it essentially kept pace with SCHG during the big run-up but lost less in downturns.
  • QGRO’s 5-year (since inception in Sept 2018) comes in around ~11.7%/year (NAV). This is slightly behind the Russell Growth (~15%/yr over a similar span), likely because QGRO’s initial index (STOXX Quality Growth) had some conservative tilts. However, QGRO still turned in a strong absolute result (approx +75% cumulative over 5 years). Notably, on a 5-year cumulative basis QGRO +74% vs Russell 1000 Growth +81% (through 3/31/23) – a gap that narrowed in 2023-2024 as QGRO outperformed.
  • SPMO’s 5-year (2018–2023) has been roughly in line with the S&P 500. It had stellar years (2020 +28%) and some underperformance in roaring bull years (2019, 2021). Over 5 years ending May 2025, SPMO likely delivered on the order of ~12% annualized. For example, a Reddit analysis of SPMO vs others notes “very little performance downside… [SPMO] matches VOO (S&P500) in worst case” – indeed over the long run it has tracked or slightly exceeded the S&P. Its factor timing gave it a boost in some periods (e.g. late 2018 rotation, 2022), roughly offsetting times it lagged.
  • FDG’s 5-year (since Mar 2020) cannot be fully measured (it’s just over 5 years old in mid-2025). From inception 3/31/2020 through 3/31/2025, FDG’s NAV grew about +14.2% cumulative – that’s only ~2.7%/yr. However, this is a bit misleading because FDG launched right at the tail of the COVID crash rally. If measured from a slightly later baseline (post initial volatility), its return would be higher. Still, it’s clear FDG did not capitalize on the 2020-21 boom enough to compensate for 2022. For a rough proxy 5-year (assuming data backfilled to Jan 2018 via a similar strategy), it might have been high (active growth funds in that period often were >20%/yr in 2019-21), but without actual data we rely on the live record which underperformed. FDG’s since inception total return is only ~+12–15% (NAV $25 -> ~$28), vastly underperforming indexes. This is a reminder that stock selection risk in active growth can hurt if picks falter.
  • SAMT has <5-year history (inception 2022), so no 5Y data. But we can note that if one hypothetically backtested Strategas’ themes over a full 5-year including the pre-2022 boom, it might show strong returns (many macro themes like big-tech, defense, etc., did very well pre-2022). However, in real performance since launch, SAMT hasn’t yet demonstrated outperformance over a full cycle.

In summary, over 5 years the broad-based SCHG (and by extension, GARP) delivered excellent absolute returns, doubling investors’ money. The specialized ETFs have more mixed long-term records: QGRO is solid but just shy of the benchmark; SPMO roughly matches or slightly beats the S&P with different path; FDG’s live record is disappointing over its 3+ year life (and would require a strong future to justify its high-octane approach).

It is worth noting that all these growth ETFs handily beat value-oriented investments over the past 5 years – growth was the place to be (despite 2022’s setback). However, the volatility of returns differed significantly, as covered in the Risk section. An investor’s experience holding these would have ranged from the relatively smooth compounding of SCHG or GARP to the wild rollercoaster of FDG.

(Performance caveat: Past performance is not indicative of future results. The above figures are based on historical NAV total returns and index data. They serve for comparison purposes in this analysis.)

4. Sector Exposures and Portfolio Weighting Differences

Although all funds target “growth” equities, their sector allocations differ based on their selection criteria and timing. Below we compare how each ETF is positioned across sectors:

• Technology: Most of these ETFs are heavily weighted in the Tech sector, but to varying degrees. SCHG, as a broad growth index, has the highest tech exposure (~45–50%) – essentially mirroring the Russell 1000 Growth’s tech weight (which was 46.2% as of early 2025). GARP is similarly tech-heavy; in fact, as of a recent report, GARP had about ~49% in Technology (its top holdings include Microsoft, NVIDIA, Apple, etc., just like the index). SPMO’s sector weight fluctuates with market leadership – in mid-2022, momentum held a large chunk in Energy, but by 2023–2024 it rotated back to Tech. Currently SPMO is again very Tech-oriented (roughly 40–50% in Tech, as the “Magnificent 7” stocks have been recent outperformers). QGRO has a sizable tech allocation but notably less concentrated than SCHG – by design it spreads weight to other sectors. For example, QGRO’s top 10 holdings (only ~29% of the fund) included tech names (Texas Instruments, Palo Alto Networks) but also non-tech like Booking (Consumer Discretionary) and Eli Lilly (Healthcare). We infer QGRO’s tech weight is still its largest sector but likely in the ~30–35% range, lower than SCHG’s 45%. FDG interestingly is underweight Tech relative to the benchmark – about 35.7% in Info Tech vs 46.2% in the Russell Growth. FDG instead allocates more to other growth sectors (consumer, healthcare). This is likely due to its stock selection of “early stage” growth which includes many consumer internet, healthcare innovators, etc., not just traditional tech. SAMT can swing its tech exposure dramatically based on themes. In 2023, one theme was AI, which gave it high tech exposure; but SAMT also had themes in industrials and gold, which dilute tech weight. As of May 2025, SAMT’s largest sector was actually Industrials (~19.5%), followed by Financials (~12.8%), then presumably Tech and others. This underscores that SAMT is not predominantly Tech at all times – it is truly multi-sector when themes call for it (e.g., an “Industrial Renaissance” theme led to big industrial weights).
• Consumer Discretionary: Growth funds often hold a lot of consumer discretionary (Amazon, Tesla, etc.). SCHG has significant exposure here (~15–20%). FDG is overweight Consumer Discretionary at 19.2% vs 14.9% benchmark – it holds names like Tesla, Amazon, Shopify, etc. in size. GARP includes discretionary names too (Mastercard, Meta are sometimes classified differently, but likely ~10–15%). QGRO holds discretionary growth companies (Booking Holdings was its top holding at ~3.5%, and it likely owns Amazon, Tesla in smaller weights). SPMO’s consumer exposure depends on momentum – currently some consumer names like Tesla or travel/retail stocks have good momentum, so it has some allocation (exact % varies). SAMT again varies; for instance, it holds Costco (Staples) 4.7% and Robinhood (Fintech) 3.1% – those span consumer sectors. We saw Consumer was one of SAMT’s notable sectors, presumably around mid-teens percent.
• Communication Services: This sector includes internet/media growth stocks (Alphabet, Meta, Netflix). Most funds have 10–15% here. SCHG ~13% (Meta, Google). FDG is at 15.3% Comm Svcs vs 12.8% benchmark – overweight, thanks to holding Meta, Netflix, Spotify, etc. (FDG’s growth picks in digital media). GARP holds the big comm names too (Meta was 4% holding, likely ~10% sector). QGRO had Netflix (3%) and Meta (3.5%) in top 10, plus others, so it likely has a healthy Comm weight (~10%+). SPMO will hold these if they’ve shown momentum (Meta and Netflix have, so momentum index has owned them). SAMT’s themes could include communications, but currently it seems less focused there (no major comm services in top holdings except indirectly via financial tech or media theme if any).
• Healthcare: Growth funds often underweight Healthcare except for biotech or pharma with high growth. SCHG’s healthcare weight is modest (~7–8%). FDG, however, has a notable overweight in Health Care (13.6% vs 7.8% benchmark). FDG owns names like Moderna or biotech growth stories (and as of Mar 2025, top 10 included a pharma/biotech “Anyan Pharmaceuticals” ~3.5%). QGRO also holds some health/stable growth (Eli Lilly 2.95%, Boston Scientific 2.45% in top 10); its Health sector was ~12% of the fund (since QGRO includes “stable growers” like large pharma). GARP’s index has some health (e.g., UnitedHealth, Lilly – quality companies with reasonable valuations), but likely similar to market weight (~10%). SPMO historically hasn’t held a ton of healthcare unless certain pharma had strong momentum (occasionally they do). In mid-2023, biotech was not a big momentum play, so likely low weight. SAMT might include healthcare if thematic (e.g., a “MedTech innovation” theme could lead to holdings like Intuitive Surgical – which it does hold ~3.15%). So SAMT’s health weight was maybe ~3–5% recently.
• Financials: Growth funds usually underweight traditional Financials (banks, etc.), but GARP and SAMT make interesting exceptions. GARP had ~12% in Financial Services – likely including fintech or quality financials (Mastercard, Visa often classified as financials but function like growth tech). FDG had ~9% Financials vs 7.7% benchmark, owing to holdings like Progressive Corp (2.7%) and fintech names. QGRO holds some financials too (Progressive 2.7%, Uber – classified in Industrial/transport or maybe tech – but also fintech like Block or Paypal might appear if they fit quality growth criteria). SCHG’s financial exposure is mostly fintech (credit card networks) which is a small part of the index. SAMT holds nearly 13% Financials – in its case, this includes Berkshire Hathaway (3.97% weight) and Robinhood (3.15%), among others, as part of a “financial opportunity” theme. Momentum (SPMO) will include financials only if they’ve been winning – e.g., in early 2021 some bank stocks had momentum, but typically financials aren’t a large part of the momentum index (except things like Visa/Mastercard sometimes). SPMO’s current financial exposure is likely moderate.
• Industrials, Energy, Others: These typically have smaller weights in growth funds, but momentum and thematic strategies can diverge:
  • Energy: Russell Growth index had virtually 0% in Energy in recent years (energy stocks were mostly classified as value). SCHG and QGRO similarly have minimal energy. SPMO, however, had a large energy stake in 2022 – at one point, 7 of its top 10 holdings were energy companies after the March 2022 rebalance, leading to a sizeable energy weight (this is why SPMO only fell 10% in 2022 while S&P fell 18%). By 2023, as energy momentum cooled, SPMO rotated out. Currently energy is likely a small portion again. FDG and GARP hold almost no energy (FDG had only 1% energy). SAMT can include energy if thematic (e.g., an “Oil & Gas revival” theme). It appears SAMT did not heavily invest in energy in 2022 (instead, it had gold as an inflation hedge and industrials for infrastructure).
  • Industrials: Not big in pure growth funds (Russell Growth ~5%). FDG had ~5.1% (close to benchmark). GARP ~6%. QGRO possibly a bit more because it might hold defense or industrial tech firms in stable growth (maybe ~11% if including things like Quanta Services which SAMT holds as infrastructure). SPMO’s industrial exposure depends on momentum in that sector (in 2021–22, some industrials like defense contractors had momentum, so it can appear). SAMT is notably overweight Industrials (~19.5%) as of 2025 – it specifically added an “Industrial Power Renaissance” theme (including Quanta Services 3.3%, Entergy 3.8% – a utility often grouped with industrial theme of power, etc.).
  • Consumer Staples & Utilities: These defensive sectors are usually underrepresented in growth funds (since many staples/utilities are slow-growth). SCHG has minimal Staples (maybe a few like Costco or Coca-Cola if they barely qualify as growth). FDG had only ~1.1% Staples (very low) and 0% Utilities. GARP might hold a couple of stable growers in Staples (maybe 2–3%). QGRO could include a Costco or Pepsi if they meet growth criteria (Quality Growth index likely includes some stalwarts), but overall low single digits. SAMT does not shy from these if they fit a theme – e.g., it holds Costco 4.7% (Staples) and Entergy 3.8% (Utility) as part of its thematic plays. Momentum (SPMO) rarely holds utilities or staples unless they’ve had strong price runs (low chance except in market panics when defensives rally – even then momentum usually still finds faster moves elsewhere).
  • Cash/Gold: Uniquely, SAMT held ~7% cash and ~4% gold trust recently. This is highly unusual for an equity ETF – it reflects a tactical defensive stance or a thematic bet on gold prices. Other ETFs here remain fully invested in equities and do not hold cash or commodities (aside from miners within equity). SAMT’s inclusion of gold (via Sprott Physical Gold Trust, 4.1% weight) was likely a hedge against inflation or a theme on monetary policy. This allocation helped diversify its sector exposure beyond typical equity sectors.

To visualize the differences, consider FDG vs the Russell Growth benchmark: FDG is underweight Technology (35.7% vs 46.2%) and Consumer Staples (1% vs ~4%), but overweight Consumer Discretionary (19.2% vs 14.9%), Communication Services (15.2% vs 12.8%), Healthcare (13.6% vs 7.8%), and holds zero in Utilities/Real Estate (the benchmark has small ~0.5% weights). This reflects FDG’s strategy of picking high-growth names wherever they are – many happen to be in retail, media, or healthcare innovation rather than just traditional IT. By contrast, GARP and SCHG stick closer to market-cap weights – e.g., SCHG’s Info Tech ~45%, Cons Disc ~17%, Comm ~12%, Health ~8%, etc., very close to the index.

Momentum (SPMO) can swing sectors the most aggressively: in 2022 it had a large Energy overweight (helping performance) and reduced Tech; by 2023–24 it swung back to heavy Tech. This dynamic sector rotation is a key feature – an investor in SPMO must be comfortable that the sector mix will look very different at different times (sometimes it may hold sectors one wouldn’t typically associate with “growth” if those sectors are on a price upswing).

Thematic (SAMT) is a special case – it constructs its own sector allocation from the bottom-up themes. As of May 2025, its portfolio was a unique blend: top exposures in Industrials (~19%), Financials (13%), Consumer ( likely ~10-15%), with meaningful positions in Healthcare (via Cencora, Intuitive Surgical) and even a gold trust. It had no single sector over 20%, which is far more balanced than SCHG or FDG. About 38.7% of SAMT’s assets are in the top 10 holdings (vs ~50% for the average fund in its category), indicating it spreads across themes fairly evenly. In effect, SAMT provides diversification across non-correlated themes – e.g., a defensive gold play alongside high-growth tech, etc. This can be advantageous if multiple themes play out, but it also means SAMT might lag pure tech-heavy funds when tech dominates the market (since some of its capital is in other areas).

In summary, sector-wise:

• SCHG (and by extension, GARP and partially QGRO) is dominated by Technology, then Consumer Discretionary and Communication – classic large-cap growth sectors.
• FDG diversifies a bit more into Health and Consumer, not just Tech, aligning with its search for growth in various industries (e.g., biotech).
• QGRO also diversifies – it doesn’t concentrate as much in FAANGs, giving more weight to sectors like Health and Financials than the cap-weighted index does.
• SPMO will concentrate opportunistically – currently tech, but in other cycles could be resources or others. It is the most sector-fluid fund here.
• SAMT is truly multi-sector by design – it may hold significant positions in sectors typically considered value or defensive if the macro theme calls for it. It is the broadest in sector exposure among these, which can offer unique diversification (industrials, staples, utilities, etc., all in one growth-oriented fund).

Investors should consider these sector tilts as they influence the cyclicality and defensive characteristics of each ETF. For example, FDG and SCHG (tech-heavy) will be more sensitive to the tech cycle and interest rates, whereas SAMT’s inclusion of industrials, utilities, and gold could provide some cushion in a tech downturn (but conversely might hold it back if tech soars unabated). GARP’s sector balance (closer to index weights but with slight shifts) contributed to its consistent performance – avoiding massive overweights in any one hot sector helps control risk.

5. Tax Considerations: Capital Gains and Tax Efficiency

Tax efficiency is an important aspect for investors in taxable accounts. All six ETFs are structured as equities ETFs, which generally are very tax-efficient due to the in-kind creation/redemption mechanism (minimizing realized gains inside the fund). We examine their capital gains distributions and other tax-relevant features:

• Capital Gains Distributions: Remarkably, most of these ETFs have never distributed capital gains to shareholders since inception. This is a key advantage of the ETF structure, even for active or high-turnover strategies:
  • SPMO (Momentum), despite its high turnover (index rebalancing semi-annually often swapping ~30-50% of holdings), has never paid out a capital gain distribution. In other words, Invesco has managed the fund’s flows such that gains are realized in-kind and not passed through. This is confirmed by investors noting SPMO’s zero capital gains despite heavy trading. Its high turnover could have led to gains if it were a mutual fund, but the ETF mechanism prevented that. Additionally, SPMO’s dividend distributions are very low (trailing 12-month income yield ~0.5%), which means minimal tax from dividends as well. In sum, SPMO has been extremely tax-efficient – essentially all return is delivered as unrealized appreciation (until the investor sells).
  • SCHG (Schwab Growth) likewise has no history of capital gains distributions. Broad index ETFs almost never distribute gains, since they can easily purge low-basis stocks via in-kind redemptions. SCHG’s turnover is low (due to tracking an index), and with an expense ratio of just 0.04%, it’s designed to be tax-efficient. Its only taxable distributions are its small quarterly dividends (SEC yield ~0.39%), which are qualified dividends from the underlying stocks.
  • GARP (iShares) has not distributed gains either since inception in 2020. BlackRock’s ETF management is very tax-aware. GARP’s turnover isn’t extremely high (it tracks an index with annual reconstitution), and any rebalancing gains have been handled in-kind. The fund’s tax efficiency is evidenced by its lack of capital gain payouts. Investors only receive the fund’s quarterly dividend (~0.45% trailing yield).
  • QGRO (American Century) – As an index ETF, QGRO also has not paid capital gains. It rebalances monthly in small increments (to adjust between stable and high growth allocations), but that has been managed without taxable events. American Century’s ETF trust uses in-kind baskets as well. For 2024, for instance, QGRO’s year-end capital gain distribution was $0.00 (none). QGRO only paid a tiny income dividend (around 1.44 cents/share in Dec 2024), reflecting a ~0.3–0.4% yield.
  • FDG (American Century active) – Despite being an active, non-transparent ETF with high turnover, FDG has never distributed a capital gain either. In 2024, FDG’s scheduled capital gains distribution was $0.00 (short-term) and $0.00 (long-term). This indicates that even with its frequent trading, FDG was able to utilize the proxy in-kind redemption mechanism to remove low-basis stocks without taxable sales. Notably, FDG uses the Precidian/AP semi-transparent model (publishing a proxy portfolio). Some questioned if such structures would be as tax-efficient as fully transparent ETFs – FDG’s record so far suggests yes, it maintained ETF tax efficiency. It’s also worth noting FDG’s portfolio generated almost no dividend income (many holdings are non-dividend growth stocks), so it paid no distributions at all in many periods. For example, FDG’s ordinary income distribution in Dec 2024 was $0.00. Thus FDG might be the ultimate tax-efficient growth vehicle – it realizes growth entirely as NAV appreciation with virtually no current taxable distributions.
  • SAMT (Strategas) – This is the one outlier. SAMT did end up distributing some capital gains/income to shareholders. In 2023 and 2024, SAMT paid year-end distributions of $0.345 and $0.409 per share respectively. At a share price around $32, that’s about a 1.2–1.3% yield attributable largely to realized gains. Why did SAMT distribute gains when others did not? A few reasons:
    • As an active ETF with relatively small asset base ($150M), SAMT may not have had enough creation/redemption activity to fully wash out all gains in-kind. If an ETF doesn’t see large outflows, it can’t as easily expel low-basis stocks. Many shareholders likely stayed invested, so realized gains from theme rotations (e.g. selling one theme’s stocks at profit) had to be distributed.
    • SAMT holds some instruments that aren’t equities (e.g. gold trust). Redemptions in-kind typically work best with stocks. Selling a commodity trust or maintaining a large cash position could generate taxable interest/gains that have no in-kind offset. For instance, if SAMT trimmed its gold trust holding for rebalancing, that sale realized a gain that would be taxable.
    • Turnover was very high (91% annually), increasing the chance of realizing gains in a short timeframe.
      So, SAMT has been less tax-efficient than the others. In essence, SAMT delivered ~1.3% of its NAV in taxable distributions in 2024 (classified likely as ordinary income or short-term gains given the short holding periods). This is not egregious, but it does reduce after-tax returns for taxable investors. The other funds delivered virtually 0% in capital gain distributions.

Tax-efficiency summary: For long-term investors in taxable accounts, FDG, GARP, SPMO, SCHG, and QGRO have proven to be very tax-efficient, deferring almost all gains. An investor would mainly incur capital gains tax when selling their shares (at which point they hopefully have long-term gains). Meanwhile they get minimal yearly taxable income (just a small dividend yield if any). SAMT is slightly less tax-efficient, having delivered some taxable gains annually – though if held in a tax-sheltered account, this is a non-issue.

Qualified Dividends: The dividends that these funds do pay (from underlying stock dividends) are generally qualified dividends eligible for lower tax rates, since most holdings are U.S. or developed-market companies held for requisite periods. For example, SCHG’s 0.44% yield and GARP’s 0.45% yield are mostly qualified. FDG’s lack of dividends means nothing to tax until sale. SPMO’s 0.5% yield is from S&P 500 constituents’ dividends, which are qualified. SAMT’s income portion includes some qualified dividends from stocks (Costco, etc.) but also potentially non-qualified income (its cash yield, any REITs or certain trusts would produce non-qualified income). Given SAMT’s modest dividend (it paid ~$0.41 in Dec 2024 which included some income), even if partially non-qualified, the impact is small.

Cost basis and turnover considerations: High turnover funds (FDG, SPMO, SAMT) could generate more internal gains, but as shown, the ETF structure mostly shields you until you sell. One thing to note is that FDG, GARP, SAMT are all relatively new (inception 2020–2022), so they haven’t faced a scenario of massive redemptions or decades of embedded gains. If they become highly appreciated over many years, one would watch if they maintain zero distributions. However, ETF managers have shown the ability to manage even highly appreciated funds (e.g. QQQ or SPY) with no cap gains distributions for decades.

Tax-cost Ratio: Morningstar’s tax-cost ratio (not cited here but anecdotally) for these funds has been very low (often <0.5%/yr for distribution drag) for all but SAMT.

Use in tax-loss harvesting or rotation: Because these ETFs follow different strategies, an investor could rotate among them for tax purposes if needed (e.g., switch from SCHG to GARP to realize a loss or avoid wash sale if selling one – since they track different indexes, they’re not “substantially identical”). This could be a nuanced advantage when managing capital gains taxes externally.

In conclusion, five of the six ETFs score top marks on tax efficiency, behaving in a tax-friendly manner even with active management (FDG) or high turnover (SPMO). SAMT has a somewhat higher tax cost due to distributions; investors in high tax brackets may prefer it in IRAs or 401(k)s, or monitor its year-end payout if holding in taxable accounts.

6. Dividend Yields and Distribution Characteristics

Growth-oriented ETFs generally offer low dividend yields, as they focus on companies that reinvest for growth rather than pay out income. Here’s how these funds compare in terms of yield and distribution habits:

• Dividend Yields: All six ETFs yield well under 1%, far below the S&P 500’s ~1.5% yield. Specifically:
  • FDG effectively has a 0% yield. Its 30-day SEC yield is –0.24% (negative), meaning the fund’s expenses slightly exceed the tiny amount of dividends its holdings pay. Many FDG holdings (e.g., Tesla, Amazon, biotech startups) pay no dividends. Thus, FDG investors should not expect regular income – it’s purely for capital appreciation. In fact, FDG has never made a dividend distribution to date (zero in 2022–2024).
  • GARP has a modest yield of around 0.45% (trailing 12-month). The fund holds some cash-generative companies (for example, Apple and Microsoft, which do pay small dividends, as well as perhaps some financials or health stocks paying 1–2% yields). These contribute to a small quarterly payout. But relative to its ~35x P/E, that yield is minimal – almost all earnings are being retained by its companies for growth, as intended.
  • SPMO’s yield is about 0.5%. As an S&P 500 subset, it receives the dividends of those 100 momentum stocks. Historically, momentum stocks tend to have lower dividends than the index average (many are growth stocks that reinvest profits). SPMO’s top holdings like big tech or energy in 2022 had modest payouts (energy companies had higher yields but that was offset by tech with none). Investors can expect small quarterly dividends here. For example, SPMO paid out $0.30/share in Q4 2022 and ~$0.14 in Q1 2023 – equating to ~0.5% annualized.
  • SCHG has a 0.4%–0.5% yield. As of April 30, 2025 its distribution yield was 0.44%. The fund pays dividends quarterly (March, June, Sept, Dec). These distributions are the sum of all dividends from its 200+ holdings, which include Apple (0.6% yield), Microsoft (0.8%), Visa (0.8%), etc., and many zero-yield names (Amazon, Meta, etc.). Over 12 months SCHG paid about $0.11 per share on a NAV in the mid-$20s, confirming the sub-0.5% yield. The dividend growth for SCHG has been low (these companies are not raising dividends significantly; any growth in payouts comes mainly from adding more shares of dividend-payers as NAV grows). In SeekingAlpha, SCHG’s 5-year dividend growth rate is ~3%, which is negligible in dollar terms.
  • SAMT has a higher yield relative to the others, around 1.2–1.3% lately. However, this is somewhat misleading as a “dividend” – it includes the year-end capital gain distribution discussed earlier. SAMT’s actual income yield from dividends of holdings is likely under 0.5%. But in 2023 it paid total distributions of ~$0.345 + $0.409 = $0.754/share (two distributions), which on a ~$31 NAV is ~2.4%. Breaking that down, ~$0.41 was in Dec (mostly capital gains) and ~$0.34 in mid-year (possibly a one-time or semiannual payout of accumulated gains/income). The indicated yield of 1.28% on CNBC likely averages those out. If we consider only recurring dividend income, SAMT holds a mix of dividend payers (Costco yields ~0.8%, Entergy 4%, Berkshire 0%, etc.) so pure income yield might be ~0.4–0.5%. The rest of that yield is non-recurring gains. For an investor, though, the total distribution yield of ~1.3% was taxable similarly to a dividend. Going forward, SAMT’s yield will depend on if it again realizes gains to distribute. It also means SAMT’s total return includes some distributed gains – one might reinvest those to keep full exposure.
  • QGRO has a low yield, roughly 0.3–0.5%. In 2024 it paid a $0.0144/share dividend in December plus small amounts earlier, summing to only a few cents per share annually. That’s about 0.1–0.2% of NAV – extremely low. Likely this was just one quarter’s dividend (maybe QGRO pays quarterly and had ~$0.04 total in 2024). The SEC yield for QGRO isn’t explicitly listed but given similar holdings to GARP, we can assume ~0.5% or less. Many QGRO stocks are non-dividend payers or low yield (Netflix, Meta, Spotify, etc., none of which pay dividends). So like FDG, QGRO is almost purely for growth, not income.

Distribution Frequency: All the ETFs pay distributions quarterly (except SAMT, which has thus far made distributions semi-annually or annually, likely on an as-needed basis). SCHG, GARP, QGRO, SPMO follow a regular quarterly schedule (Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec). Their payouts vary with the dividends received. For example, SCHG’s last four distributions were around $0.02–0.03 each quarter. SPMO’s were a bit lumpy but roughly $0.14–0.30 quarterly in 2022 (because momentum index changes can temporarily affect timing of dividends).

FDG being effectively zero-yield, paid no distributions quarterly – it simply doesn’t declare dividends since there is no net income. If one checks FDG’s history, each quarter the distribution was $0.000. This can be a benefit for compounding in taxable accounts (no drag from reinvesting small dividends and no tax until sale).

SAMT’s distribution pattern is unusual: it paid $0.345 in June 2023 and $0.409 in Dec 2024. It appears SAMT might accumulate any net income/gains and distribute at year-end (and possibly mid-year if needed). The December distribution likely includes realized gains from that year’s thematic rotations (treated as capital gains distribution to investors). This is more similar to an active mutual fund’s behavior. If SAMT has net losses carried forward, it might skip distributions in future years (for instance, it likely harvested some losses in 2022 that offset some 2023 gains, hence 2023’s distribution wasn’t larger).

Reinvestment: Investors can of course reinvest these small dividends. In practice, given how small they are, most of the total return is driven by price appreciation, not reinvested dividends, for all these funds. The compounding from reinvested 0.5% yields is minimal.

Implications: None of these ETFs are suitable for income-focused investors – the yields are an order of magnitude below high-dividend or even broad market funds. The low yields are a deliberate consequence of focusing on companies that plow earnings back into growth projects.

One positive aspect of low yields is tax deferral (as discussed): you’re not forced to take taxable income. Another is that in a tax-advantaged account, you’re effectively automatically reinvesting earnings internally for growth. The downside is that in sideways markets, these funds won’t pay you much to wait (whereas a dividend fund might).

To illustrate, an investor in FDG or QGRO should expect zero to near-zero cash flow from the investment – all the reward comes when you sell shares at (hopefully) a higher price. For some, this is fine (e.g., a young investor in accumulation phase). For someone needing current income, these funds are inappropriate unless one plans to periodically sell shares to create “homemade dividends.”

Finally, it’s worth noting the character of distributions:

• For SCHG, GARP, QGRO, SPMO: distributions are 100% qualified dividends (and possibly a tiny long-term cap gain for SPMO if any, but none so far). So they are taxed at the lower dividend tax rate.
• For FDG: none distributed.
• For SAMT: the distributions included short-term gains (taxed as ordinary income) given the short holding periods of some stocks. That $0.409 in Dec 2024 could have been short-term gain distribution (if those stocks were held <1 year), meaning a higher tax rate. This makes SAMT’s distributions somewhat less tax-favorable. However, part could be long-term gains if any position was held >1 year.

Conclusion on distributions: Extremely low yields across the board define these growth ETFs. Investors should plan for growth, not income. Among them, SAMT had the highest nominal “yield” recently (~1%+), but that was largely a one-off gain distribution – not a steady income stream. The prudent approach is to view any distributions from these funds as incidental. The real driver of returns (and what one should focus analysis on) is capital appreciation.

In practice, many growth ETF holders reinvest those small dividends automatically. The difference in total return with vs without dividend reinvestment is minor (for example, SCHG’s 5-year NAV return vs market price return differ by only a few basis points, confirming minimal impact of dividends).

One slight benefit of small distributions: they can be used to dollar-cost average. If an investor has a dividend reinvestment plan, those pennies buy a bit more shares on dips, but again, the effect is marginal due to size.

7. Forward-Looking Outlook and Growth Potential

Finally, we consider the future prospects and growth potential for each ETF’s strategy, given current market conditions and secular trends. While forecasting is inherently uncertain, we can discuss each fund’s positioning and what might drive its relative performance in the coming years:

• Macro Environment Considerations: As of mid-2025, the market is digesting higher interest rates (the Fed tightened in 2022–23) and generative AI-driven optimism in tech. Growth stocks staged a big comeback in late 2023 and early 2024. Going forward, factors like interest rates, economic growth, and market leadership shifts will be critical:
  • If interest rates decline or stabilize, that generally benefits growth stocks (long-duration assets). Funds like FDG and SCHG (heavy in tech/growth) would likely get a valuation expansion tailwind. Conversely, if rates rise further or stay elevated, high-P/E growth names could face pressure – in that scenario, GARP’s value discipline might shine by avoiding the most rate-sensitive pricey stocks.
  • If the economy slows or a recession hits, we could see a rotation from speculative growth to quality and defensive growth. QGRO and GARP would be well-suited for that, as they emphasize profitable, resilient companies. FDG, owning more unprofitable or early-stage firms, could underperform in a risk-off environment. Momentum (SPMO) might initially get whipsawed (because yesterday’s winners can quickly become losers in a downturn), but it will eventually rotate into whatever is working – possibly defensive stocks – capturing the new trend. SAMT in a downturn might shift themes (for instance, increase gold or cash, or invest in defensive sectors) – its flexibility is an asset, but its calls need to be correct.
  • If we get a soft landing with continued moderate growth, then earnings growth will matter and stock picking/factors can add value. Under that benign scenario, all these funds could do well, but the highest growth names (FDG’s picks) might excel as their earnings re-accelerate without macro headwinds. Meanwhile, GARP’s relative advantage might narrow (as investors become willing to pay more for growth, not worrying as much about “reasonable price”).
• Technology and Innovation Boom: A major theme is the ongoing AI and digital transformation boom. 2023 saw AI-related stocks (Nvidia, etc.) explode higher. Going forward:
  • FDG is positioned to capture emerging innovation – its mandate allows it to load up on the next wave of big growth winners (perhaps AI software, biotech breakthroughs, etc.). Indeed, FDG’s active managers can identify nascent trends early. If, say, AI 2.0 or new disruptive tech drives the market, FDG could own those pure-plays more heavily than an index would. For example, FDG already had ~13% in NVIDIA and large positions in other high-growth tech. However, this cuts both ways: if some hyped innovation fails or falls short, FDG may suffer by overweighting it. The focused nature means stock-picking skill is critical. American Century’s team (which includes seasoned growth managers) will need to continue selecting the right winners (they did hold NVDA, TSLA, etc., which bodes well).
  • SCHG will certainly benefit from the major tech trends too – it will hold all the mega-cap innovators (Microsoft for AI cloud, Alphabet for AI, Apple for technology ecosystem, etc.). It’s a market-cap-weighted bet on Big Tech and broader growth. If the Magnificent 7 (Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, Nvidia) keep outperforming, SCHG will continue to do well. However, SCHG won’t give you much exposure to smaller innovators outside the top cap tier – those would be captured more by FDG or QGRO.
  • QGRO and GARP both incorporate quality filters which can sometimes exclude cutting-edge but unproven tech. For instance, GARP might underweight a stock like Tesla (if valuations are too high or quality metrics not ideal) – which in 2020-21 was a big outperformer. Going forward, if the market continues to reward speculative high growth, these funds might lag slightly. However, their stance might protect from bubbles. They will still own the likes of Nvidia, but probably not at outsized weights if valuations detach from fundamentals. QGRO in particular uses a dynamic allocation – if the market environment favors “stable growth” (slower, steadier companies) due to volatility, QGRO will tilt more there, sacrificing some upside in frothy rallies but adding safety if things swing.
  • Momentum (SPMO) is almost agnostic to theme – it will chase whatever works. If AI continues to drive stock performance, SPMO will have heavy AI exposure. If a different sector (say, renewable energy or biotech breakthrough) starts to show the strongest returns, SPMO will shift into those within 6 months. Thus, SPMO is well-positioned to capture new trends provided they sustain for a few months or more. It is not great at one-month fads, but for genuine medium-term trends (like the multi-quarter AI rally or any secular run), momentum will latch on. A risk is if market leadership becomes extremely choppy or mean-reverting – momentum can suffer whipsaw (e.g., a scenario of rapid rotations could cause underperformance, as might happen if we get alternating risk-on/risk-off months).
  • SAMT in terms of innovation will rely on its thematic research. Strategas might, for example, dedicate a theme to “AI & Automation” or “Next Gen Healthcare” if they foresee big opportunities. In fact, they mentioned focusing on how AI’s impact is maturing and shifting. If their thematic choices are prescient, SAMT could capture multi-year growth themes possibly ahead of broad indexes. One advantage: SAMT can include smaller caps and off-index ideas (Rocket Lab for “space economy” theme etc.), giving exposure beyond the usual suspects. The key forward-looking question for SAMT is, will its 3-5 chosen themes outperform the broad market? If yes, SAMT could deliver outsized returns; if even one or two themes falter, it could drag on performance. Given current positioning: themes in industrial infrastructure, AI, and perhaps consumer reindustrialization – these could pay off if we see government spending on infrastructure, widespread AI adoption boosting certain firms, etc. The presence of defensive hedges (gold, cash) suggests SAMT is also guarding against tail risks – if inflation resurges or a crisis hits, that gold stake might help. This could make SAMT relatively resilient if 2025–2026 bring turmoil (but conversely could lag a roaring bull if that cash and gold don’t appreciate as much as equities).
• Valuations and Mean-Reversion: After the 2023 rally, growth stocks are not cheap. Forward P/Es for the Nasdaq-100 are in the high 20s. This means future returns may rely more on earnings growth catching up to valuations rather than further P/E expansion. In that environment, earnings quality and consistency might be prized:
  • That could favor Quality Growth (QGRO) and GARP, as investors become choosier about paying for growth. We might see a shift from “growth at any price” to “growth with solid earnings”. Indeed, Morningstar’s Gold rating on GARP reflects an expectation that its balanced approach will continue to outperform over a full cycle. If markets get more fundamentally driven, GARP and QGRO could shine by owning companies that actually deliver earnings and ROE, not just hype.
  • FDG faces the challenge that its high-growth holdings must deliver very high earnings increases to justify valuations. The forward-looking question: will the ~50% EPS growth of its companies materialize (and continue)? If yes, FDG’s holdings could see dramatic stock price increases, driving FDG to outperform. For example, if FDG’s biotech bets successfully launch new drugs or its tech disruptors keep doubling revenues, FDG will benefit more than a broad index that is diluted with slower growers. However, if growth disappoints or if interest rates stay high, FDG’s richly valued stocks could stagnate or fall. It’s a high-beta, high-reward, high-risk proposition going forward. Active management will be critical – FDG’s team must separate future Amazons from the future Pets.coms, so to speak.
  • Sector rotations: If leadership broadens beyond tech in the coming years (e.g., suppose energy or industrials have a renaissance due to policy or economic shifts), then momentum (SPMO) and SAMT are positioned to adapt and take advantage, whereas SCHG (and QGRO/GARP to an extent) will remain heavily in tech/growth regardless. In 2022 we saw energy’s resurgence – SPMO capitalized on it, SCHG missed it entirely. In the future, similar scenarios could occur. For instance, if we enter a commodity supercycle or a period of cyclical value stock outperformance, SPMO would rotate there (though note: SPMO is limited to S&P 500 names, so it can only go so far into value sectors; it did about 20% energy at peak). SAMT could directly allocate a theme to, say, “Resource Reflation” and buy things like miners, which no other fund here would touch. So in a diversified portfolio context, owning SPMO or SAMT alongside SCHG/GARP can hedge bets – if growth leadership falters, momentum or thematic might pick up new leaders.
  • Macro wildcard – inflation: If inflation unexpectedly re-accelerates, that typically hurts long-duration growth stocks (present value of future earnings declines). GARP and quality funds might hold up a bit better because they own companies with pricing power and reasonable valuations. Momentum could quickly shift into inflation beneficiaries (e.g., commodity stocks again). FDG’s kind of stocks (unprofitable growth) would likely suffer until inflation/rates settle. SAMT has explicitly shown readiness for inflation with gold exposure. So for an inflationary outlook, GARP, SPMO, and SAMT might be preferable; for a disinflationary growth boom, FDG and SCHG likely soar.
• Outlook for Dividends/Buybacks: Not a major factor for these, but note that many large-cap growth companies have begun share buybacks (Apple, Google) and even dividend growth. That could marginally increase yields/return of SCHG/GARP over time. However, it’s still minor compared to valuation and growth dynamics.
• Regulatory/Political Factors: Big tech (key holdings in SCHG, GARP, QGRO) faces regulatory risk (antitrust, privacy regulations). If something material affected the mega-caps, SCHG would be hit hardest (since it’s market-cap weighted in them). GARP/QGRO would also feel it, though perhaps slightly less if they have capped exposures. FDG might be less impacted if its focus is more on emerging leaders rather than the current giants. SAMT could pivot themes if regulatory winds change (e.g., could emphasize “regulated industries” if that becomes attractive). Momentum would adjust positions if any big tech faltered in stock performance due to regulation. This is just one example of an exogenous risk that could shuffle relative performance.

Putting it all together:

• SCHG offers a no-frills way to ride overall growth. Its outlook depends on the continued dominance of U.S. large-cap growth. If you believe mega-cap tech will keep delivering solid earnings and remain market leaders, SCHG should continue to perform well. It’s hard to beat in a scenario of broad-based, steady growth. Its low fee gives it an automatic head start over higher-cost active funds. However, SCHG will underperform niche strategies if market leadership narrows or certain factors dominate (as we saw in 2022 when SCHG fell more than some factor funds). It’s a core growth holding, likely to deliver whatever the growth segment delivers (analysts currently forecast decent earnings growth for big tech in 2025–26, albeit not as explosive as earlier).
• GARP has a favorable forward outlook for those worried about valuation risk. It provides exposure to growth but with a margin of safety (quality and reasonable pricing). If the market gets more discerning (which often happens in late-cycle or volatile periods), GARP could continue to outperform pure growth. It essentially tries to capture 80–90% of the upside but only, say, 60–70% of the downside – and it has achieved that historically. Given its strong management (BlackRock’s indexing plus the robust MSCI GARP index methodology) and low fee, we expect GARP to remain a strong risk-adjusted choice. Morningstar’s Gold rating reflects confidence that its approach is durable. Going forward, if earnings growth broadens to some cyclical sectors (financials, industrials), GARP will capture that because it doesn’t ignore those segments if they meet criteria. In a stock picker’s market, GARP should do well; in a speculative mania, it might lag the high-flyers.
• SPMO (Momentum) is like a tactical chameleon – its future performance will depend on the persistence of trends. Historically, momentum as a factor has yielded excess returns over full cycles, but with potentially sharp short-term reversals. The outlook for momentum is good if we see clear, trending leadership (e.g., certain sectors continuing to outperform for quarters at a time). For instance, if AI-related stocks keep climbing steadily, SPMO will ride that wave until it crests. Or if next year energy makes a comeback for fundamental reasons, SPMO will rotate in. The risk is if 2025–2026 are characterized by frequent leadership turnover or range-bound markets – momentum could then underperform due to whipsaw. That said, the momentum index’s semi-annual rebalance provides some buffer (it won’t over-trade on every blip, only at set intervals), which historically has worked well (the index has outpaced the S&P in multiple periods). As a growth investor, one might use SPMO to augment returns when specific sectors are leading – SPMO will capture that without you having to guess which sector. Forward-looking, many strategists still see tech and select growth industries leading the market, which bodes well for SPMO’s current holdings. Additionally, if market breadth improves (more stocks participating in rallies), SPMO can hold those diverse winners (it always holds 100 stocks, so broader rallies actually give it more to choose from).
• FDG (Focused Dynamic Growth) has the highest upside potential but also high risk. If we enter another period like 2017–2021 where fast-growing, innovative companies are richly rewarded by the market, FDG could vastly outperform. Its concentrated bets could become multi-baggers. For example, if one of its top 5 holdings is the “next Amazon” and rises 10x, FDG’s NAV would skyrocket (NVIDIA’s huge 2023 gain already contributed meaningfully, and FDG has ~13% in it). However, FDG’s outlook is less bright if growth stocks struggle with fundamentals or valuations. Its performance relative to peers will depend on stock selection skill: American Century’s team needs to consistently pick winners and cut losers. Active growth management can add a lot of value in the right environment – e.g., avoiding blowups (like not owning some growth stocks that crashed). FDG did underperform the index recently, but maybe lessons were learned. Looking ahead, if we have a stock-pickers’ market in growth (where a few big winners drive returns and many others falter), a focused fund like FDG could concentrate in those winners and beat the index. Conversely, if performance is more uniformly distributed or if the team picks wrong, FDG could lag. In summary, FDG is high-beta on growth style – bullish on growth? FDG amplifies that; bearish or uncertain on growth? FDG would be vulnerable.
• SAMT (Strategas Macro Thematic) is a bit of a wild card – its forward success hinges on macro calls and theme timing. The advantage is flexibility: SAMT can go anywhere (any cap, any sector, some non-equities). If Strategas identifies a few key powerful themes that drive the next few years (say, “AI industrial revolution”, “Reshoring supply chains”, “Rise of fintech”, etc.), SAMT might outperform broad indexes by being in the right places at the right time. For example, one theme in SAMT is AI’s evolving impact – if AI truly transforms not just tech but industrial and financial sectors, SAMT’s multi-sector AI-related picks (maybe Quanta Services for AI in grid management, Cencora in healthcare logistics optimization, etc.) could excel beyond just pure tech stocks. Another theme might be infrastructure and industrial renaissance – with bipartisan support for infrastructure spending, SAMT’s holdings like Quanta or Entergy could see strong earnings, and the fund already positions for that. The risk is theme misfires: if one of its ~4 themes underperforms (e.g., gold stays flat or falls while stocks rise, dragging that portion; or a small-cap pick like Rocket Lab doesn’t pan out), it can be a performance drag. Also, SAMT’s high turnover and active bets mean higher management risk – it’s essentially an actively managed portfolio of ~40 stocks, so outcomes depend on manager skill. On the bright side, its thematic breadth provides some diversification – currently it’s not all in on one idea, but spread across AI, industrials, consumer, financials, etc. That means it might have a smoother ride than a single-theme ETF (like an AI-only fund or a fintech-only fund). If we assume moderate success in each theme, SAMT could steadily outperform the market. If one theme really takes off, it could strongly beat the market. Conversely, a wrong macro call could see it lag (as it initially did at launch during 2022’s turmoil).

In terms of suitability and strategy:

• An investor bullish on broad tech and growth can stick with SCHG for a low-cost, reliable exposure.
• An investor seeking downside protection and solid risk-adjusted growth may lean toward GARP or QGRO – these likely won’t top the charts in a speculative frenzy, but over a full cycle they should do well (Morningstar projects QGRO’s balanced approach to perform solidly with lower volatility, hence its 5-star rating).
• For a tactical overlay or satellite, SPMO (Momentum) is attractive – it’s almost like a momentum algorithm working for your portfolio, rotating to keep you in the leading momentum names. It could complement a core like SCHG by adding responsiveness to trends.
• FDG might appeal to those who believe active stock picking in growth can beat the market – perhaps due to inefficiencies or the ability to spot winners early. It’s essentially an aggressive bet that the managers can outperform the index using their concentrated approach. If you have high conviction in certain growth names that align with FDG’s portfolio, it could amplify those bets.
• SAMT is suitable for those who want an active macro overlay – it’s almost a mini hedge-fund approach within an ETF. It may do well in scenarios where macro thematics (like policy-driven or secular shifts) play out, even if broad equity indexes tread water. It also might provide some diversification benefits relative to pure growth funds, due to its inclusion of things like gold and different sectors (as evidenced by its relatively low R-squared of ~0.85 vs S&P 500).

Forward-looking bottom line: All these ETFs are positioned for growth, but they offer different paths:

• Stable, core growth (SCHG) – likely to perform in line with the fate of Big Tech and large-cap earnings. Outlook positive if Big Tech continues its trend of innovation + share buybacks + moderate growth.
• Quality, value-conscious growth (GARP, QGRO) – positioned to outperform in a world where fundamentals regain importance. Outlook is positive especially if the market experiences volatility – these funds could be the “sleep at night” growth holdings that still capture upside. Expect slightly lower volatility and a smoother ride, with competitive returns. They might lag slightly in a rip-roaring speculative rally, but over several years they aim to deliver a better risk/reward.
• High-octane active growth (FDG) – outlook is binary: could significantly outperform if its stock picks succeed in the coming tech innovations cycle, or could continue to lag if the environment remains challenging for unprofitable growth. Given that 2022 likely washed out a lot of froth, one could argue the forward picks in FDG may have more reasonable starting points now. The fund is in a sense reset after the drawdown, potentially ready to climb if its names execute well.
• Momentum (SPMO) – very nimble and historically effective. Outlook depends on trending markets. With the market still in an upward trend for many growth stocks as of 2025, momentum could keep working. If leadership rotates, SPMO will adapt, so it’s a good way to not have to guess which sector will lead – trust the momentum algorithm. One caveat: if 2025 brings a lot of sector mean-reversion (leaders quickly becoming laggards and vice versa), momentum might underperform a static index due to head-fakes.
• Thematic (SAMT) – has the most unconstrained mandate, so its outlook is tied to Strategas’ foresight. Given macro uncertainties (inflation path, de-globalization, AI impact, etc.), an active thematic approach could either add a ton of value (if they read these correctly) or not. The presence of non-equity and defensive plays in SAMT could help if we hit a rough patch (it’s almost a mild hedge). In a strong bull where broad growth does well, SAMT might lag simply because it isn’t 100% in high-beta tech (unless its themes pivot to be). It’s a unique diversifier in a growth portfolio, and its forward potential is high if multi-theme investing beats single-factor investing.

To conclude, an investor’s choice among these ETFs may boil down to philosophy and outlook:

• If you want low-cost broad exposure and believe in the long-term “law of large numbers” of big growth companies, SCHG is a solid core holding.
• If you prioritize risk-adjusted returns and are wary of overhyped stocks, GARP or QGRO offer growth with a quality/value overlay – a prudent approach in uncertain times.
• If you want to capitalize on market trends without constantly monitoring them, SPMO (Momentum) is almost a “strategy in a box” that does it for you – promising to keep you with the market’s winners (albeit with some whipsaw risk).
• If you’re seeking alpha via stock selection and can tolerate the swings, FDG is a high-conviction play on American Century’s growth-picking ability – potentially rewarding if their insight into early-stage growth pays off.
• If you trust macro research and thematic conviction, SAMT provides a one-stop way to invest in big-picture themes that could transcend sectors (AI, infrastructure, etc.), which might deliver uncorrelated growth.

A forward-looking portfolio might even combine several of these to balance factors – e.g., use SCHG or QGRO as core, add a dash of SPMO for momentum capture, and maybe a slice of FDG or SAMT for aggressive bets – thereby covering many bases in growth investing.

In summary, each ETF is well-suited to a particular growth investment outlook:

• SCHG: Steady participation in U.S. large-cap growth – outlook tied to continued tech leadership.
• GARP: Growth but with discipline – outlook good for navigating whatever comes with less volatility.
• SPMO: Adaptive strategy to follow winners – outlook good if trends persist; a way to potentially outperform by not staying in laggards.
• FDG: Pure growth conviction – outlook high-upside if stock picks excel; essentially an aggressive growth fund for bullish scenarios.
• SAMT: Opportunistic macro plays – outlook dependent on Strategic theme success; could shine in scenarios others don’t (providing a nice complement).
• QGRO: Balanced growth/quality – outlook strong for consistent if not flashy performance, likely to outperform if froth comes out of market and quality is rewarded.

Investors should align these with their own market views and risk appetites. It’s advisable to keep an eye on expenses and tax efficiency (where most of these excel, especially SCHG, GARP, SPMO, QGRO) and to ensure one’s portfolio remains diversified (for example, FDG and SCHG overlapping heavily in mega-cap tech might be redundant, whereas adding SPMO or SAMT can diversify how growth is accessed).

Given current consensus expectations (moderate economic growth, peaking rates, strong tech earnings from AI), the outlook for growth stocks is cautiously optimistic – which bodes well for all these ETFs in absolute terms. The differentiation will come in how they handle any plot twists in the market narrative. In that regard, each brings a unique strength to the table, whether it’s GARP’s restraint, SPMO’s agility, or SAMT’s foresight. A growth-oriented investor can leverage these ETFs to calibrate their desired balance between bold growth pursuit and prudent risk management in the journey ahead.

Sources:

• Fund Fact Sheets and official data (American Century, iShares, Schwab, Invesco) for portfolio characteristics, risk measures, and performance.
• ETF Database / Yahoo Finance for historical returns and holdings insights.
• Reddit and investor commentary for anecdotal evidence on tax efficiency and strategy behavior.
• Morningstar and Bloomberg for ratings and forward-looking analyses (Morningstar Medalist ratings, Sharpe ratios, etc.).
• Strategas ETF reports for thematic strategy discussion.
• Capital gains distribution records from sponsor websites.